A COVID clash: How to proceed when IACUCs and IBCs disagree?

It wasn’t easy for Dr. Marty Mayfield to secure a promise from a friend and colleague to send him a small number of mice that exhibited clinical disease when infected with the coronavirus causing COVID-19 disease. The colleague, Dr. David Raush, had been a lab-mate of Mayfield’s while they were post-doctoral scholars at Great Eastern University, where Mayfield still worked. The biggest hurdle had been ensuring the safe transport of the uninfected animals to Great Eastern because an escaped mouse, even if not carrying the virus, would be a public health threat. Although that problem was resolved, an equally significant problem faced Mayfield.

Mayfield proposed to perform his mouse experiments at the ABSL-3 level and keep the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus under BSL-3 conditions. But although Mayfield had proper past experience working under BSL-3 and ABSL-3 conditions, Great Eastern did not have BSL-3 or ABSL-3 facilities. Mayfield was well aware of this problem and with the knowledge of the school’s IACUC and Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) chairpersons, he had submitted IACUC and IBC applications to a nearby contract research organization (CRO) that had the needed biocontainment facilities and would allow Mayfield to use those facilities. Both of those applications had been approved by the CRO and now, following Great Eastern policy, the same approved applications were submitted for concurrence by the IBC and IACUC of Great Eastern University. The IACUC voted to agree with the CRO’s approval, but the IBC did not, citing inadequate containment if a mouse were to escape from its cage while at the CRO. The result was a de facto halt to the planned experiments.

Mayfield was livid, and after an informational phone call to OLAW, he argued with the IACUC chairman that only one IACUC was legally required to approve a protocol application, and he already had that approval from the CRO’s IACUC. There was no need for any additional concurrence by the Great Eastern IBC, said Mayfield, especially after the Great Eastern IACUC agreed with the CRO’s IACUC and the CRO’s IACUC was in agreement with the CRO’s biosafety committee. The chairman brought the issue to the Great Eastern IACUC. What are the pertinent regulatory requirements for the Great Eastern IACUC to follow and would you support Mayfield or the Great Eastern IACUC?

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Compliance requires communication and cooperation

This scenario could have been avoided with better communication and planning. Although Great Eastern University (GEU) has an institutional policy that requires concurrence with collaborating entity oversight committees, guidance on how conflicts are resolved or negotiated appears lacking. The GEU IACUC should have developed guidelines for collaborative studies with other institutions that included a requirement for a written agreement with the collaborating organization and the responsibilities of each party for the various aspects of the animal care and use program such as protocol review, animal ownership, veterinary care, and IACUC oversight authority. A written collaboration agreement can also specify oversight responsibilities specific to biohazards and IBC review. The Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) from each institution should (promptly) communicate to try to allay the concerns of GEU’s IBC. Considering the close proximity of the two facilities it should even be possible for the GEU IBC or some of its members to visit the Contract Research Organization (CRO) to see if their concerns are justified, or to suggest amendments to the CRO IBC application.

Mayfield was correct when he said that approval by more than one IACUC is not required to meet federal regulatory requirements, but GEU has an internal policy that requires concurrence with external review, presumably by all appropriate compliance committees. The GEU IACUC’s concurrence with the CRO’s IACUC and IBC may not “override” the requirement for their IBC to also concur.

There are a variety of details missing from this scenario that would help determine the best course of action to take. If the project is funded by an agency that has adopted PHS Policy, both institutions may be required to have a PHS Assurance, but GEU must verify IACUC approval. If both institutions are AAALAC International accredited, that could make the process of dual oversight simpler and may help alleviate the concerns of the GEU IBC. In this case, if the details were included in the written understanding, it would seem more appropriate to have the CRO’s committees be responsible for the protocol approval because the animal work will take place there. Also, their committees are likely to have more experience working with ABSL-3 studies. GEU should ask for the documents associated with IBC approval for the ABSL-3 work as well as follow-up documents such as annual reviews, any noncompliance, etc.

Institutions should develop policies and procedures that allow them to easily resolve issues that arise when collaborative research projects are presented to them. One institution has implemented and published methods for facilitating regulatory oversight for multi-site research. This “could provide a model for a distributed, national network of IACUC reliance.”
The GEU IACUC and IBC should work collaboratively with each other and the CRO to address both the concerns of the GEU IBC and the researcher to ensure compliance with federal regulations and internal policy while recognizing the priority of the COVID-19 related research.

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It takes two to MOU

When evaluating this scenario, OLAW provides clear guidance on IACUC oversight of interinstitutional collaborations. Institutions should have formal written contracts outlining the responsibility for “offsite animal care and use, animal ownership, and IACUC review.” If the research is sponsored by federal funding, the NIH Grants Policy further requires the agreement to incorporate applicable PHS Policy requirements for review and approval of proposed animal activities, significant changes, and semiannual IACUC program review. The PHS Policy requires that the research be conducted within an assured institution, whose IACUC would have purview.

If both Great Eastern University (GEU) and the CRO are assured, Dr. Mayfield is correct in that there is no federal requirement for dual IACUC review and it becomes undue university-level regulatory burden. However, the institutional IBC is a separate entity with a different role, as defined by the NIH Guidelines. Regulatory guidance involving interinstitutional IBC collaborations is lacking, and Mayfield should not assume that OLAW’s policy applies. The NIH Guidelines state that “each institution (and the [IBC] acting on its behalf) is responsible for ensuring that all research… conducted at or sponsored by that institution is conducted in compliance with the NIH Guidelines.” Since GEU is sponsoring the study, its IBC remains responsible for oversight in a manner in which it feels is most appropriate. One could argue that because GEU does not have BSL-3 facilities, its IBC may lack the necessary expertise to perform a proper risk assessment of the proposed activities at the CRO; however, that is irrelevant because it is within GEU IBC’s authority to halt the study.

Extending from these observations, it is clear for this scenario that the establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between GEU and the CRO is the most appropriate path forward. Prior to its finalization, the MOU needs to not only clarify the roles and responsibilities for the project, both administratively and clinically, but it also needs to assure the fears of GEU’s IBC. Although rooted in caution, the IBC’s concerns of an escaping mouse need to be critically evaluated with a thorough risk assessment. In the authors’ experience, mice escaping from their cages is a rare event, and even rarer then for the animal to escape the room and subsequently escape from the facility. Moreover, due to infrastructure in place in ABSL3 facilities, such an escape is even less likely to occur. And finally, although the mouse can be infected with the SARS-CoV-2, is it plausible that it could transmit the virus to other animals? Or worse yet, people? This fact is critical for proper risk assessment, although the authors recognize an answer may not be apparent. The scenario in which a mouse may escape the facility and become the murine analogue of “Typhoid Mary” of SARS-CoV-2 appear infinitesimal, and this should become apparent through a thorough risk assessment. The findings of this risk assessment should be noted in the MOU between the two institutions.

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Did someone say MOU?

The sudden emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic has had a profound global impact. As the virus continues to spread, the search for a vaccine is imperative in mitigating the virus’ devastating clinical and economic effects. Due to the rapid transmission rate of the virus, biomedical research around the world has significantly increased during this crisis to develop prevention and treatment strategies. Researchers such as Dr. Marty Mayfield of Great Eastern University have stepped forward to develop these potential clinical innovations and therapeutics targeting the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus.

To conduct SARS-CoV-2 research, Mayfield needs access to an ABSL3 facility; Great Eastern does not have this capacity, so he has partnered with a CRO to perform the SARS-CoV-2 mouse experiments. He is an experienced scientist that has successfully worked within Great Eastern’s IACUC and IBC policies in the past. Given the level of necessary collaboration between Great Eastern University and the CRO, it is paramount that both institutions come to an
agreement regarding their respective roles within the scope of the research project.

Without fully knowing who is providing funding for the research, it is difficult to determine each institution’s specific responsibilities. Regulatory oversight hinges on answers to questions such as who is the actual grantee and which institution owns the animals. According to its Rules of Accreditation, AAALAC International follows animal ownership to determine who is responsible for animals at an offsite program. The grantee institution in this case is Great Eastern; the animals are thus owned by them. Assuming the funding is from the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the animal work is also covered by the Public Health Service (PHS) Policy.

As the work utilizes a recombinant mouse-adapted strain of SARS-CoV-2, an IBC must review Mayfield’s proposed work for compliance with the NIH Guidelines (Section IV-B-2-b-(1)). Coverage by NIH Guidelines “includes research collaboration or contractual agreements” (Section I-C-1-a [2]). The ABSL3 work constitutes a contractual agreement or subaward; NIH Guidelines must be met at the CRO. An IBC may, based on its home institution’s policies, allow oversight of the work by a second IBC (i.e., at the CRO).

We postulate that the difference in approvals between the CRO and Great Eastern stems from differences in either institutional risk tolerance, a lack of knowledge regarding the CRO’s ABSL3 biosafety features, or both. This risk is not without merit. Failure to adequately identify and mitigate biosafety risks at the CRO could jeopardize both human health (e.g., escaped mouse) and any further NIH funding for the grantee (Great Eastern).

To reduce the university’s institutional risk, Great Eastern’s IO and its responsible official (often, but not always the same individual) should create a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the university and CRO. Without such an MOU, Mayfield’s research cannot proceed. The MOU should clearly state that the onus of all IACUC and IBC regulatory oversight and compliance lies with the CRO. In this way, we believe that University risk is mitigated while allowing Mayfield’s valuable SARS-CoV-2 work to proceed.

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